General Reading List

Consciousness
B.A. Philosophy of Mind

General reading

**Papineau, D. Thinking about Consciousness
**Chalmers, D. The Conscious Mind

A good anthology:
Chalmers, D. (ed) Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings

A good internet resource:
http://consc.net/online/

Physicalism

**Papineau, D. Thinking about Consciousness (ch. 1)
Snowden, P. ‘On Formulating Materialism and Dualism’ in J. Heil (ed) Cause, Mind and Reality
Crane, T. and Mellor, D. H. ‘There is no Question of Physicalism’ in Mind 1990

Consciousness

**Chalmers, D. The Conscious Mind (ch. 1)
Block, N. ‘Concepts of Consciousness’ in Philosophy of Mind (above)
**Nagel, T. ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’ in Philosophical Review 1974

The Explanatory Gap

**Levine, J. ‘Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap’ in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 1983
Tye, M. ‘Phenomenal Consciousness: the Explanatory Gap as Cognitive Illusion’ in Mind 1999.

The Knowledge Argument

**Jackson, F. ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’ in Philosophical Quarterly 1982
Papineau, D. Thinking about Consciousness (ch. 2)
Lewis, D. ‘What Experience Teaches’ in Philosophy of Mind (above)
Crane, T. The Elements of Mind (ch. 3 section 28)

The Modal Argument

**Kripke, S. Naming and Necessity (especially lecture 3)
Hill, C. S. ‘Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem’ in Philosophical Studies 1997
Papineau, D. Thinking about Consciousness (ch. 3)

Unger’s Argument

**Unger, P. ‘The Mental Problems of the Many’ in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 1
**Unger, P. All the Power in the World (ch. 7)
Sider, T. ‘Maximality and Microphysical Supervenience’ in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2003

Previous Exam Questions

2008
“Mary could know all the physical facts, but not know what it is like to see red. So Physicalism is false.” Discuss.

“Fundamentally, an organism has conscious mental states iff there is something it is like to be that organism.” Discuss.

2007
What exactly does Jackson’s Mary learn when she leaves her black and white room?

2006
“Someone who knew all the physical facts abut colour, but had never seen
red, would learn something new on seeing red. But this presents no
problem to a physicalist, because it shows only that there are phenomenal
concepts, not phenomenal properties.” Discuss.

In what sense, if any, is there an explanatory gap between physical facts and
facts about consciousness?

2005
What is the problem of consciousness, and can it be resolved?

How far does the citation of phenomenal concepts provide solutions to problems
about qualia?