The Modal Argument
1 - It is conceivable that someone is in pain but doesn’t have their c-fibres firing.
2 - Whatever is conceivable is metaphysically possible.
3 - So, it is metaphysically possible that someone is in pain but doesn’t have their c-fibres firing(1, 2).
4 - If something is an instance of type A but not an instance of type B, then type A isn’t identical with type B.
5 - So, it is metaphysically possible that being in pain is not identical to having ones c-fibres fire (3,4).
6 - If it is metaphysically possible that x is not y, then x is not y.
7 - So, being in pain is not identical to having ones c-fibres fire (5, 6).
(Or, with tokens:
1 - It is conceivable that this pain exists, but this firing of c-fibres does not.
2 - Whatever is conceivable is metaphysically possible.
3 - So, it is possible that this pain exists but this firing of c-fibres does not (1, 2).
4 - So, it is possible that this firing of c-fibres is not identical to this headache (3).
5 - If it’s possible that x is not y, x is not y.
6 - This headache is not this firing of c-fibres (4, 5).
And we can run these arguments the other way around. For example, in the type case we start with the premise:
1 - It is conceivable that someone has their c-fibres firing but isn’t in pain.
And proceed in the obvious way.
And we can do the exactly analogous thing in the token case.)
Metaphysical possibility - very roughly
It is metaphysically possible that P iff it is a mind and language independent fact that the world could have been such that P.
Premise 2
Conceivability is plausibly evidence for possibility. But why suppose that everything conceivable is possible? Our other faculties are not infallible. In response, it has been argued that if we think we can conceive of an F that isn’t a G, even though F is G, we really conceive of a non-F/G with all the properties most commonly associated with Fs but none most commonly associated with Gs. But the pain case cannot be like this. If an experience has all the properties most commonly associated with being in pain, then it’s a pain.
Has the anti-Physicalist described the only way in which the faculty of conceiving can lead us into error?
Thursday 26 March 2009
Monday 23 March 2009
Lecture 4 Summary
1 - Mary knows all the physical truths about seeing red without ever having seen red.
2 - Mary comes to know something new about seeing red when she leaves the room - she learns what it’s like to see red.
3 - Therefore, not all the truths about seeing red are physical.
Physicalism is refuted only if it’s construed as this thesis:
All the truths about every kind of conscious experience are truths about kinds of physical state.
Recall that a truth is an object of propositional knowledge. So on this construal of Physicalism, it’s the thesis that once one knows everything about conscious experiencing that can be learnt in science lessons, one cannot extend one’s knowledge of it. But Mary seems to do so. Therefore Physicalism is false.
But consider a world with 2 gods. Each knows all the physical truths, but neither knows which god He is. Each can advance His knowledge by coming to know which god He is. Nonetheless, each state of the world is a physical state. So we ought to distinguish:
- Each state of this world is physical - True.
- Each truth about this world is physical - False (given what ‘truth‘ means for us).
Similarly, perhaps each kind of conscious experience is really a kind of physical state, despite not all truths about conscious experiencing being physical truths. Mary may extend her knowledge by seeing the rose - just as our imagined god might extend His knowledge. Perhaps her new experience enables her to have new knowledge because it gives her new concepts. (Now she can think about red in terms of what it’s like to see.) The knowledge argument might undermine the above construal of Physicalism, but it doesn’t undermine this more interesting construal:
All kinds of conscious experience are kinds of physical state.
2 - Mary comes to know something new about seeing red when she leaves the room - she learns what it’s like to see red.
3 - Therefore, not all the truths about seeing red are physical.
Physicalism is refuted only if it’s construed as this thesis:
All the truths about every kind of conscious experience are truths about kinds of physical state.
Recall that a truth is an object of propositional knowledge. So on this construal of Physicalism, it’s the thesis that once one knows everything about conscious experiencing that can be learnt in science lessons, one cannot extend one’s knowledge of it. But Mary seems to do so. Therefore Physicalism is false.
But consider a world with 2 gods. Each knows all the physical truths, but neither knows which god He is. Each can advance His knowledge by coming to know which god He is. Nonetheless, each state of the world is a physical state. So we ought to distinguish:
- Each state of this world is physical - True.
- Each truth about this world is physical - False (given what ‘truth‘ means for us).
Similarly, perhaps each kind of conscious experience is really a kind of physical state, despite not all truths about conscious experiencing being physical truths. Mary may extend her knowledge by seeing the rose - just as our imagined god might extend His knowledge. Perhaps her new experience enables her to have new knowledge because it gives her new concepts. (Now she can think about red in terms of what it’s like to see.) The knowledge argument might undermine the above construal of Physicalism, but it doesn’t undermine this more interesting construal:
All kinds of conscious experience are kinds of physical state.
Thursday 19 March 2009
Lecture 3
Consciousness - Lecture 3
B.A. Philosophy of Mind
Mary, a brilliant scientist, knows all the physical truths about human beings. However, she has never seen anything that isn’t black, white or grey. One day she leaves her black and white room and sees a red rose.
The Knowledge Argument
1 - Mary knows all the physical truths about seeing red without ever having seen red.
2 - Mary comes to know something new about seeing red when she leaves the room - she learns what it’s like to see red.
3 - Therefore, not all the truths about seeing red are physical.
4 - Therefore, Physicalism is false.
Lewis’ Response
Mary gets new knowledge, but doesn’t learn a new truth. She gains know-how. She gains abilities. For example, she can now imagine and remember seeing something red.
A response:
Mary’s new knowledge involves representing the world a certain way. She articulates her new knowledge by saying “seeing red is like this”. Her knowledge has a truth evaluable content, so it is not just know-how. It is not like knowing how to bake or swim.
Crane’s response to The Knowledge Argument
The argument aims to refute the thesis that every truth about a kind of conscious experience is really a truth about a kind of physical state. What is a truth? If the argument is to work, they must obey this principle: If it’s possible to know truth A without knowing truth B, then A is not identical with B. But if truths obey this principle, it seems that no Physicalist would want to formulate their view in terms of truths. Consider Sarah, who knows all the physical truths about Sherwood Forest, but is lost. Then she learns a new truth: “Major Oak is over there”. Therefore not all truths about the forest are physical truths. The appropriate response is to formulate Physicalism as we have been doing: every kind of conscious experience is really a kind of physical state.
B.A. Philosophy of Mind
Mary, a brilliant scientist, knows all the physical truths about human beings. However, she has never seen anything that isn’t black, white or grey. One day she leaves her black and white room and sees a red rose.
The Knowledge Argument
1 - Mary knows all the physical truths about seeing red without ever having seen red.
2 - Mary comes to know something new about seeing red when she leaves the room - she learns what it’s like to see red.
3 - Therefore, not all the truths about seeing red are physical.
4 - Therefore, Physicalism is false.
Lewis’ Response
Mary gets new knowledge, but doesn’t learn a new truth. She gains know-how. She gains abilities. For example, she can now imagine and remember seeing something red.
A response:
Mary’s new knowledge involves representing the world a certain way. She articulates her new knowledge by saying “seeing red is like this”. Her knowledge has a truth evaluable content, so it is not just know-how. It is not like knowing how to bake or swim.
Crane’s response to The Knowledge Argument
The argument aims to refute the thesis that every truth about a kind of conscious experience is really a truth about a kind of physical state. What is a truth? If the argument is to work, they must obey this principle: If it’s possible to know truth A without knowing truth B, then A is not identical with B. But if truths obey this principle, it seems that no Physicalist would want to formulate their view in terms of truths. Consider Sarah, who knows all the physical truths about Sherwood Forest, but is lost. Then she learns a new truth: “Major Oak is over there”. Therefore not all truths about the forest are physical truths. The appropriate response is to formulate Physicalism as we have been doing: every kind of conscious experience is really a kind of physical state.
Lecture 2
Consciousness - Lecture 2
B.A. Logic and Metaphysics
An argument from The Explanatory Gap
1 - If a particular headache suffered by someone, Chris, is really some physical state, then positing that state explains why Chris has a headache.
2 - There is no physical state such that positing it will explain why Chris has a headache.
Therefore:
The headache is not a physical state.
Premise 2
Consider the old cliché: this headache is this firing of c-fibres. We can intelligibly say the following: I see that her c-fibres are firing - but why is being in that physical state the same as having a mental state that feels the way a headache does? Why doesn’t it feel like nothing at all to have one’s c-fibres firing?
Here, c-fibres are just standing in for any physical state - however complicated. Specify any kind of physical state of Chris and claim that this is her headache. It is still intelligible to say: but why does being in that state feel like having a headache - rather than feeling like nothing at all?
Other physical accounts of everyday phenomena are not like this (e.g. digestion). This seems to be evidence that a physical account of conscious experiences cannot be right.
However:
Perhaps the Physicalist can respond that conscious experiences are only special in this regard because of the way we can conceptualise them. We can think of them in terms of what they are like to be in. Physical accounts of other everyday phenomena seem more explanatorily satisfying because we conceptualise those phenomena in terms of their causal role.
B.A. Logic and Metaphysics
An argument from The Explanatory Gap
1 - If a particular headache suffered by someone, Chris, is really some physical state, then positing that state explains why Chris has a headache.
2 - There is no physical state such that positing it will explain why Chris has a headache.
Therefore:
The headache is not a physical state.
Premise 2
Consider the old cliché: this headache is this firing of c-fibres. We can intelligibly say the following: I see that her c-fibres are firing - but why is being in that physical state the same as having a mental state that feels the way a headache does? Why doesn’t it feel like nothing at all to have one’s c-fibres firing?
Here, c-fibres are just standing in for any physical state - however complicated. Specify any kind of physical state of Chris and claim that this is her headache. It is still intelligible to say: but why does being in that state feel like having a headache - rather than feeling like nothing at all?
Other physical accounts of everyday phenomena are not like this (e.g. digestion). This seems to be evidence that a physical account of conscious experiences cannot be right.
However:
Perhaps the Physicalist can respond that conscious experiences are only special in this regard because of the way we can conceptualise them. We can think of them in terms of what they are like to be in. Physical accounts of other everyday phenomena seem more explanatorily satisfying because we conceptualise those phenomena in terms of their causal role.
Lecture 1
Consciousness - Lecture 1
B.A. Philosophy of Mind
Are there any philosophical reasons to suppose that our conscious experiences cannot be physical states of our bodies?
- What’s meant by a conscious experience?
I’m going to be focusing on one sense of ‘conscious’. Roughly: conscious experiences are mental states that it feels a certain way to be in. To use Nagel’s famous phrase, it’s like something to have a conscious experience.
Examples:
- pains
- sensory experiences
- dizzy spells
Contrast with:
- beliefs
- character traits
- What’s meant by a physical state of a body?
We’ll consider arguments that aim to show that conscious experiences must be fundamentally different from any paradigmatic state of any natural science. They would show that they’re of a different sort to physical, biological, neurological, computational…states of the body. For our purpose, a physical state of a body is a state of the same kind as the paradigm states discovered and described by (existing) natural sciences.
Type-Token distinction
Type
Is each type of conscious experience really a type of physical state?
Token
Is each token conscious experience really a token physical state of a persons body?
B.A. Philosophy of Mind
Are there any philosophical reasons to suppose that our conscious experiences cannot be physical states of our bodies?
- What’s meant by a conscious experience?
I’m going to be focusing on one sense of ‘conscious’. Roughly: conscious experiences are mental states that it feels a certain way to be in. To use Nagel’s famous phrase, it’s like something to have a conscious experience.
Examples:
- pains
- sensory experiences
- dizzy spells
Contrast with:
- beliefs
- character traits
- What’s meant by a physical state of a body?
We’ll consider arguments that aim to show that conscious experiences must be fundamentally different from any paradigmatic state of any natural science. They would show that they’re of a different sort to physical, biological, neurological, computational…states of the body. For our purpose, a physical state of a body is a state of the same kind as the paradigm states discovered and described by (existing) natural sciences.
Type-Token distinction
Type
Is each type of conscious experience really a type of physical state?
Token
Is each token conscious experience really a token physical state of a persons body?
General Reading List
Consciousness
B.A. Philosophy of Mind
General reading
**Papineau, D. Thinking about Consciousness
**Chalmers, D. The Conscious Mind
A good anthology:
Chalmers, D. (ed) Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings
A good internet resource:
http://consc.net/online/
Physicalism
**Papineau, D. Thinking about Consciousness (ch. 1)
Snowden, P. ‘On Formulating Materialism and Dualism’ in J. Heil (ed) Cause, Mind and Reality
Crane, T. and Mellor, D. H. ‘There is no Question of Physicalism’ in Mind 1990
Consciousness
**Chalmers, D. The Conscious Mind (ch. 1)
Block, N. ‘Concepts of Consciousness’ in Philosophy of Mind (above)
**Nagel, T. ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’ in Philosophical Review 1974
The Explanatory Gap
**Levine, J. ‘Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap’ in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 1983
Tye, M. ‘Phenomenal Consciousness: the Explanatory Gap as Cognitive Illusion’ in Mind 1999.
The Knowledge Argument
**Jackson, F. ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’ in Philosophical Quarterly 1982
Papineau, D. Thinking about Consciousness (ch. 2)
Lewis, D. ‘What Experience Teaches’ in Philosophy of Mind (above)
Crane, T. The Elements of Mind (ch. 3 section 28)
The Modal Argument
**Kripke, S. Naming and Necessity (especially lecture 3)
Hill, C. S. ‘Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem’ in Philosophical Studies 1997
Papineau, D. Thinking about Consciousness (ch. 3)
Unger’s Argument
**Unger, P. ‘The Mental Problems of the Many’ in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 1
**Unger, P. All the Power in the World (ch. 7)
Sider, T. ‘Maximality and Microphysical Supervenience’ in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2003
Previous Exam Questions
2008
“Mary could know all the physical facts, but not know what it is like to see red. So Physicalism is false.” Discuss.
“Fundamentally, an organism has conscious mental states iff there is something it is like to be that organism.” Discuss.
2007
What exactly does Jackson’s Mary learn when she leaves her black and white room?
2006
“Someone who knew all the physical facts abut colour, but had never seen
red, would learn something new on seeing red. But this presents no
problem to a physicalist, because it shows only that there are phenomenal
concepts, not phenomenal properties.” Discuss.
In what sense, if any, is there an explanatory gap between physical facts and
facts about consciousness?
2005
What is the problem of consciousness, and can it be resolved?
How far does the citation of phenomenal concepts provide solutions to problems
about qualia?
B.A. Philosophy of Mind
General reading
**Papineau, D. Thinking about Consciousness
**Chalmers, D. The Conscious Mind
A good anthology:
Chalmers, D. (ed) Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings
A good internet resource:
http://consc.net/online/
Physicalism
**Papineau, D. Thinking about Consciousness (ch. 1)
Snowden, P. ‘On Formulating Materialism and Dualism’ in J. Heil (ed) Cause, Mind and Reality
Crane, T. and Mellor, D. H. ‘There is no Question of Physicalism’ in Mind 1990
Consciousness
**Chalmers, D. The Conscious Mind (ch. 1)
Block, N. ‘Concepts of Consciousness’ in Philosophy of Mind (above)
**Nagel, T. ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’ in Philosophical Review 1974
The Explanatory Gap
**Levine, J. ‘Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap’ in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 1983
Tye, M. ‘Phenomenal Consciousness: the Explanatory Gap as Cognitive Illusion’ in Mind 1999.
The Knowledge Argument
**Jackson, F. ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’ in Philosophical Quarterly 1982
Papineau, D. Thinking about Consciousness (ch. 2)
Lewis, D. ‘What Experience Teaches’ in Philosophy of Mind (above)
Crane, T. The Elements of Mind (ch. 3 section 28)
The Modal Argument
**Kripke, S. Naming and Necessity (especially lecture 3)
Hill, C. S. ‘Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem’ in Philosophical Studies 1997
Papineau, D. Thinking about Consciousness (ch. 3)
Unger’s Argument
**Unger, P. ‘The Mental Problems of the Many’ in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 1
**Unger, P. All the Power in the World (ch. 7)
Sider, T. ‘Maximality and Microphysical Supervenience’ in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2003
Previous Exam Questions
2008
“Mary could know all the physical facts, but not know what it is like to see red. So Physicalism is false.” Discuss.
“Fundamentally, an organism has conscious mental states iff there is something it is like to be that organism.” Discuss.
2007
What exactly does Jackson’s Mary learn when she leaves her black and white room?
2006
“Someone who knew all the physical facts abut colour, but had never seen
red, would learn something new on seeing red. But this presents no
problem to a physicalist, because it shows only that there are phenomenal
concepts, not phenomenal properties.” Discuss.
In what sense, if any, is there an explanatory gap between physical facts and
facts about consciousness?
2005
What is the problem of consciousness, and can it be resolved?
How far does the citation of phenomenal concepts provide solutions to problems
about qualia?
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